

# VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND TECHNOLOGY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

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**Daron Acemoglu**  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Philippe Aghion**  
Harvard University

**Rachel Griffith**  
University College London

**Fabrizio Zilibotti**  
University of Zurich

## Abstract

We study the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive a number of predictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration from a simple incomplete contracts model. Then, we investigate these predictions using plant-level data for the UK manufacturing sector. Most importantly, and consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that the technology intensity of downstream (producer) industries is positively correlated with the likelihood of integration whereas the intensity of upstream (supplier) industries is negatively correlated with it. Also consistent with theory, both correlations are stronger when the supplying industry accounts for a large fraction of the producer's costs. These results are generally robust and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation strategies, and with or without controlling for a number of firm- and industry-level characteristics. (JEL: L22, L23, L24, L60)

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## 1. Introduction

Despite a large theoretical literature on the determinants of vertical integration, the economics profession is far from a consensus on the empirical determinants of vertical integration in general, and the relationship between technological change

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*The editor in charge of this paper was Xavier Vives.*

**Acknowledgments:** We thank Richard Blundell, Robert Gertner, Oliver Hart, Bengt Holmstrom, Ali Hortaçsu, Paul Joskow, Ariel Pakes, Helen Simpson, Helena Svaleryd, John Van Reenen, and seminar participants at Canadian Institute of Advanced Research, Chicago, Harvard, IIES-Stockholm, MIT and NBER, and the CEPR-IUI Waxholms Conference. This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the controller of HMSO. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. Griffith acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and Zilibotti acknowledges the support of the European Research Council (ERC Advanced Grant IPCDP-229883) and the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF Grant 100014-122636).

E-mail addresses: Acemoglu: [daron@mit.edu](mailto:daron@mit.edu); Aghion: [paghion@arrow.fas.harvard.edu](mailto:paghion@arrow.fas.harvard.edu); Griffith: [rgriffith@ifs.org.uk](mailto:rgriffith@ifs.org.uk); Zilibotti: [fabrizio.zilibotti@iies.su.se](mailto:fabrizio.zilibotti@iies.su.se)

and vertical integration in particular.<sup>1</sup> This paper provides a simple incomplete contracts model of vertical integration and, in the light of the predictions of this model, presents detailed empirical evidence on the determinants of vertical integration using UK firm-level data over the period 1996–2001.

The two leading theories of vertical integration are the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach of Williamson (1975, 1985) and the Property Right Theory (PRT) approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).<sup>2</sup> Both approaches emphasize the importance of incomplete contracts and ex post opportunistic behavior (hold up) on ex ante relationship-specific investments. The TCE approach views vertical integration as a way of circumventing the potential holdup problems. In particular, it predicts that vertical integration should be more common when there is greater specificity and holdup is more costly, and that vertical integration should enhance investments by all contracting parties. The PRT approach, on the other hand, focuses on the role of ownership of assets as a way of allocating residual rights of control, and emphasizes both the costs and the benefits of vertical integration in terms of ex ante investment incentives.

To illustrate the central insight of the PRT, consider a relationship between a supplier (upstream firm) and a (downstream) producer. Moreover, suppose that only two organizational forms are possible: (backward) vertical integration, where the downstream producer buys up the upstream supplier and has residual rights of control, and non-integration (outsourcing), where the producer and supplier are separate firms. In this world, vertical integration does not automatically improve efficiency. Instead, by allocating the residual rights of control to the producer, who has ownership and thus control of the assets if there is a breakup of the relationship, vertical integration increases the producer's bargaining power and encourages its investment. However, by the same mechanism, it also reduces the supplier's ex post bargaining power and hence her incentives to invest. Non-integration, on the other hand, gives greater investment incentives to the supplier. Thus, in contrast to the TCE approach, the PRT predicts that vertical integration should have opposite effects on the supplier's and the producer's investments. Here, vertical integration has both costs and benefits in terms of ex ante investments, and its net benefits

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1. We discuss the empirical literature herein. On the theory side, see, among others, Williamson (1975, 1985), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Bolton and Whinston (1993), Aghion and Tirole (1994a, 1994b, and 1997), and Legros and Newman (2008), together with the surveys in Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Hart (1995). Papers on the potential impact of technology on vertical integration include, among others, Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Helper (1991), Athey and Schmutzler (1995), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Marin and Verdier (2003a, 2003b), Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003), and Acemoglu et al. (2007). See also the literature on international trade and vertical integration (or outsourcing), for example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), Feenstra (1998), McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005), and Antras (2003).

2. See Whinston (2001) and Joskow (2005) for recent discussions.

depend on whether the investments of the producer or those of the supplier are more important for the output and success of the joint venture.

Although the key predictions of the TCE approach could be tested by investigating the relationship between measures of specificity and vertical integration, as Whinston (2001) also emphasizes, the PRT approach is more difficult to test directly because it makes no predictions about the overall relationship between specificity and vertical integration or between vertical integration and total investment. However, crucially for our paper, one can test some of its distinctive predictions, for example that vertical integration has opposite effects on investments by the two contracting parties.

In this paper, we develop a simple methodology to study the forces emphasized by the PRT approach. First, we shift the focus from relationship-specific investments to technology intensity. The presumption is that parties making technology investments, especially in R&D, are subject to holdup, and this will lead to the type of problems highlighted by the TCE and PRT approaches.<sup>3</sup> Second, we consider the relationship between pairs of supplying and producing industries and focus on the prediction that the correlations between vertical integration and the investment incentives of suppliers and producers should display *opposite* signs. Our approach therefore exploits cross-industry (cross-product) implications of the PRT.

We first develop these points using a simple theoretical framework and derive a number of predictions that are testable with the data we have available. The framework highlights that backward vertical integration gives greater investment incentives to the producer, while forward vertical integration encourages supplier investment. Non-integration provides intermediate incentives to both parties. This analysis leads to three key predictions:

1. The importance of the technology intensity of the producer and supplier should have opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration. In particular, whereas a higher importance of the producer's technology intensity should increase the probability of backward integration, a higher importance of the supplier's technology intensity should reduce that probability.
2. Vertical integration should be more responsive to the technology intensities of both the supplier and the producer when the supplier accounts for a larger fraction of the input costs of the producer.
3. If the relevant margin of choice is between backward vertical integration and non-integration, then technology intensity of the supplier should discourage

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3. This could be for a variety of reasons. First, R&D investments are often made for technologies specific to each firm (or their mix of products). Second, associated with any technological investment, parties are also likely to make specific, non-tangible, and largely unverifiable innovative investments. Finally, market imperfections, for example search frictions, typically turn "technologically general" investments into specific investments (e.g., Acemoglu 1996; Acemoglu and Pischke 1999).

integration, the technology intensity of the producer should encourage integration, and the importance of the supplier to the producer (measured in terms of share of costs) should encourage integration.

We investigate these predictions, and other determinants of vertical integration, using detailed data on all British manufacturing plants from the UK Census of Production (ARD). To identify the effects of both supplier and producer technology, we look across all manufacturing industries. To measure the extent of vertical integration and to develop an empirical strategy to document the determinants of integration, we need to take a stance as to whether backward or forward vertical integration is the most important alternative to non-integration. Motivated by the bulk of the prior empirical work (e.g., Joskow 1987, 2005; Stuckey 1983), we focus on backward vertical integration.<sup>4</sup> Using this data set and the UK Input–Output Table, we calculate two measures of (backward) vertical integration, defined at the level of firm–industry-pair (more precisely, for firm  $i$  producing product  $j$  with input from industry  $k$ ).<sup>5</sup> The first measure is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm owns a plant producing input  $k$  necessary for product  $j$ . The second measure calculates how much of the inputs from industry  $k$ , necessary for the production of  $j$ , the firm can produce in-house. It is useful to emphasize that what we uncover are correlations, not necessarily causal relations.

Using the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added (calculated from a sample pre-dating our vertical integration measures), we find the following correlations in the data:

- Consistent with prediction 1, technology (R&D) intensities of the producing (downstream) and supplying (upstream) industries have opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration. In particular, backward vertical integration is more likely (relative to non-integration) the greater the technology intensity of the producer and the lower the technology intensity of the supplier.
- Consistent with prediction 2, the correlations between vertical integration and the technology intensities of both the producing and the supplying industry are substantially larger and also more significant when the share of costs of the supplying industry in the total costs of the producing industry (for short, “share of costs”) is high.
- Consistent with prediction 3 (provided that the relevant margin is between backward vertical integration and non-integration), we also find that

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4. This is also the strategy implicitly adopted in other cross-industry studies of vertical integration; see, for example, Antras (2003).

5. Note that these measures do not distinguish between backward or forward integration, because we do not observe who has residual rights of control. Nevertheless, conceptually they are closer to measures of backward integration, since the question is whether firm  $i$  is integrated with its upstream suppliers (rather than firm  $j$  being integrated with downstream producers potentially using its inputs).

technology intensity of the producing industry is associated with more vertical integration, technology intensity in the supplying industry is associated with less integration, and the share of costs is associated with more integration.

We subject these basic patterns in the data to a series of robustness checks. The results are generally robust. First, including a range of firm-level covariates does not change the relationship between R&D intensity and vertical integration. Second, the results are broadly similar when we restrict attention to multiplant firms and control for firm level fixed effects.<sup>6</sup> Third, the results are similar when we proxy for technology intensity by physical investments rather than R&D. Fourth, the results are robust to excluding top or bottom quartiles of firms by size and to using an alternative measure of vertical integration. Finally, the results are also similar when we use a probit model rather than a linear probability model.

We also investigate the relationship between competition (measured as the number of firms in supplying and producing industries) and vertical integration. Our results here are also consistent with theory and indicate that having more firms in the supplying industry reduces the likelihood of vertical integration, while a larger number of firms in the producing industry increases it.

In our regressions, a measure of vertical integration is on the left-hand side, and industry and firm characteristics are on the right-hand side. However, in theory, and most likely in practice, vertical integration also affects technology choices. Moreover, other factors omitted in the regression could influence both vertical integration and technology intensity, and in a cross-industry regression there are many potential omitted variables. Although our fixed effects regressions control for many such omitted characteristics, there is still a concern regarding causality. As an imperfect attempt at dealing with the endogeneity problem, we report results where the technology intensity of each industry is instrumented with the technology intensity of the same industry in the United States. This instrumentation strategy generally yields results similar to, and in fact quantitatively larger than, the ordinary least squares strategy.<sup>7</sup> Overall, we conclude that there is an interesting pattern in the data, with technology intensity of producing and supplying industries having opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration. This pattern should be important in evaluating the predictions of a range of different theories of vertical integration (even though we have

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6. In particular, with firm fixed effects, even though the main effect of producer R&D intensity is no longer statistically significant, both supplier R&D intensity and the interaction between both supplier and producer R&D intensities and share of costs remain significant. When we control for endogenous selection, the effect of producer R&D intensity is again statistically significant.

7. However, when we simultaneously instrument for the main effects and the interaction terms, the results are imprecisely estimated.

motivated our empirical approach from a specific theory based on incomplete contracts).<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the theoretical studies mentioned earlier, this paper is related to a large empirical literature on vertical integration. In contrast to our approach, most empirical studies of vertical integration are motivated by the TCE approach and focus on a single industry. These include Joskow's (1987) seminal paper on ownership arrangements in electricity generating plants, Stuckey's (1983) study of integration between aluminium refineries and bauxite mines, Monteverde and Teece's (1982) investigation of integration in the automobile industry, Masten's (1984) work on the aerospace industry, Ohanian's (1994) work on the pulp and paper industry, and Klein's (1998) work on the Fisher Body and General Motors relationship. More recently, important papers by Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) study the trucking industry, Lerner and Merges (1998) consider the biotech sector, Woodruff (2002) studies integration in the Mexican footwear industry, Chipty (2001) investigates vertical integration and market foreclosure in the cable television industry, and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) study vertical integration in the U.S. cement industry. The only cross-industry evidence relevant to our investigation of which we are aware is due to Caves and Bradburd (1988), who document a positive cross-industry correlation between measures of specificity and vertical integration, and from Antras (2003), who looks at the share of intra-firm imports over total imports for 23 U.S. industries and relates this to capital intensity. We are not aware of any other papers investigating the prediction that the technology intensity of suppliers and producers have opposite effects on vertical integration decisions (see Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a recent survey).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and derives the main testable implications. Section 3 details the construction of our measure of vertical integration, and also discusses data sources and the construction of the other key variables. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 discusses robustness checks and additional tests. Section 6 briefly investigates the effect of competition in producing and supplying industries on vertical integration. Finally, Section 7 discusses alternative theoretical approaches that may account for the correlations presented in this paper and then concludes.

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8. Our proxies for technological intensity may be correlated with the relevant demand elasticities and impact vertical integration decision through strategic considerations, though it is unclear why this could generate the opposite-signed patterns that we find robustly in the data.

More generally, although the specific regressions estimated in this paper are motivated by the PRT approach, the results are informative about, and could be consistent with, other approaches to vertical integration. In the concluding section, we discuss how these results could be reconciled with other theories.

## 2. Theory and Empirical Hypotheses

In this section, we construct a simple theory of the determinants of vertical integration in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986). The focus is on the relative importance of technological investments in a bilateral relationship between a producer and a supplier. In the model, the two parties can either remain as separate entities (*non-integration, NI*), or the producer can employ the supplier and become the residual claimant of the profits generated by the joint venture (*backward vertical integration, VIB*), or the supplier can employ the producer and become the residual claimant (*forward vertical integration, VIF*). As already discussed in the Introduction, when we turn to data we will focus on backward vertical integration. Nevertheless, it is useful to understand the implications of the theoretical framework both for backward and forward integration.

### 2.1. Model Environment

We consider a one-period relationship between two risk-neutral parties who can undertake technological investments to increase the productivity of the relationship. Throughout, we assume these investment decisions to have a specific component in that greater technology intensity leads to a greater possibility of holdup. Decision rights over these investments cannot be transferred between the two parties, for example, because the investments require tacit knowledge or human capital. This implies that the producer cannot make the supplier's investments, or vice versa. As is standard in this literature, we assume that the investments and the output of the relationship are non-verifiable. Consequently, neither contracts conditional on investments nor contracts specifying rules for ex post revenue-sharing are possible. However, the allocation of property rights (vertical integration or arms' length) can be designed so as to provide the right incentives for the non-contractible investments.

We adopt the usual timing assumptions: Before investments and production take place, the parties can choose an organizational form and transfers. We denote the amount of ex ante transfer to party  $i$  conditional on the organizational form  $z$  by  $T_i(z)$ , where  $P$  and  $S$  denote the producer and the supplier, respectively. More formally, the timing of events in this relationship is as follows:

1. The producer offers an organizational form (ownership structure)  $z \in \{VIB, NI, VIF\}$  and associated transfers,  $T_P(z)$  and  $T_S(z)$ , such that  $T_P(z) + T_S(z) = 0$ . There are no credit constraints, implying that  $T_i(z)$  can be negative.
2. The supplier decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is not accepted, then the two parties remain independent, and the producer does not receive any specific input from the supplier (in this case, the game ends

with payoffs  $\{O_P^M, O_S^M\}$  defined subsequently). Then, the producer and the supplier simultaneously choose their investments,  $e_P \geq 0$  and  $e_S \geq 0$ .

3. The supplier and the producer bargain over the division of the revenue, according to the Nash bargaining solution given the organizational form  $z$ . Output is realized and shared.<sup>9</sup>

The production technology of the relationship is

$$F(x_S, e_P, e_S) = \varphi x_S(pe_P + se_S + 1) + (1 - \varphi)(pe_P + 1). \quad (1)$$

The first term in equation (1) is the output generated by the producer and the supplier conditional on the supplier providing a customized (relationship-specific) input, denoted  $x_S = 1$ . If  $x_S = 0$  and this input is not supplied, these activities generate no revenue. The value of the relationship can be further increased by the producer's and the supplier's investments,  $e_P$  and  $e_S$ . The parameters  $p$  and  $s$  designate the relative importance of investments by the producer and the supplier, that is, the extent to which one type of investment brings more value added than the other, and  $\varphi \in (0, 1)$  corresponds to the share of the producer's inputs accounted for by the supplier.<sup>10</sup> Note that  $\varphi$  also determines the importance of the supplier's investment,  $e_S$ .<sup>11</sup> This production function has also normalized the level of output in the absence of any investments to 1, which is without any loss of generality. The feature that there are no complementarities between the investments of the supplier and the producer is for simplicity, and highlights the fact that, for the results we emphasize, such complementarities are not essential.

To simplify the expressions, we assume that the supplier can provide the basic input  $x_S$  at no cost, and also that the costs of investment for both parties are quadratic:

$$\Gamma_P(e_P) = \frac{1}{2}e_P^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma_S(e_S) = \frac{1}{2}\varphi e_S^2. \quad (2)$$

9. In this game form, the assumptions that the producer makes the organizational form offer and that the parties receive their non-integration outside options are without loss of any generality. Moreover, following other papers in this literature, we are using the Nash bargaining solution (see Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) for a potential justification for Nash bargaining and a discussion of alternative bargaining rules), but our qualitative results do not depend on Nash bargaining.

10. With competitive spot market transactions and without any specific investments, namely,  $e_P = e_S = 0$ ,  $\varphi$  would exactly correspond to the share of costs of the producer accounted for by the supplier in question. Although with positive investments and ex post bargaining, there will be a wedge between the two, we refer to  $\varphi$  as the "share of costs" to simplify the terminology.

11. Symmetrically, we could introduce another parameter, say  $\eta$ , to capture the importance of the producer for the supplier. Comparative statics with respect to  $\eta$  are very similar to those with respect to  $\varphi$ . We omit this generalization to reduce notation, and discuss empirical results regarding the effect of a measure related to  $\eta$  in Section 5.

Notice that the investment costs of the supplier are multiplied by  $\varphi$ . This ensures that the costs are proportional to the scale of operation and that the socially optimal levels of both  $e_P$  and  $e_S$  are independent of  $\varphi$ .<sup>12</sup>

In the event of disagreement, the two parties receive their outside options, which depend on the organizational form. We denote the outside option of party  $i$  under organizational form  $z$  by  $O_i^z$ .

With backward vertical integration (*VIB*), the producer owns all assets, and in the event of ex post breakup the supplier simply walks away from the firm without receiving anything.<sup>13</sup> The producer, who has residual control rights, keeps all the assets and the customized input, but lack of cooperation from the supplier causes the loss of a fraction  $\lambda$  of the supplier’s investment, so the “effective investment” of the supplier is reduced to  $(1 - \lambda)e_S$  where  $\lambda \in [0, 1)$ .<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the outside options of the supplier and the producer in this case are

$$O_S^{VIB}(e_P, e_S) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad O_P^{VIB}(e_P, e_S) = F(x_S = 1, e_P, (1 - \lambda)e_S).$$

With non-integration (*NI*), the supplier and the producer own their separate firms and assets. In case of disagreement, the producer does not receive the customized input from the supplier ( $x_S = 0$ ), and consequently, generates no output from the part of the operations relying on those inputs. The supplier can sell her input in the market, but suffers in this case some revenue loss because of the specificity of the input to this producer. Therefore, the outside options under non-integration are

$$\begin{aligned} O_S^{NI}(e_P, e_S) &= \theta\varphi(se_S + 1), \\ O_P^{NI}(e_P, e_S) &= F(x_S = 0, e_P, e_S) = (1 - \varphi)(pe_P + 1), \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where  $\theta \in [0, 1)$  is an inverse measure of how much the supplier loses if she sells the input outside of the specific relationship.<sup>15</sup> The general equilibrium

12. The socially optimal levels of investment are  $e_P = p$  and  $e_S = s$ . Modifying the supplier’s cost function to  $\Gamma_S(e_S) = e_S^2/2$  would introduce an implicit “scale economies,” and an increase in  $\varphi$  would make the supplier’s investment more profitable (the socially optimal level of investment for the supplier would become  $e_S = s\varphi$ ). Consequently, the comparative static results with respect to  $\varphi$  become ambiguous.

13. More generally, our analysis goes through if we assume that in case of ex post break-up the supplier receives a positive fraction of what she would receive under non-integration, and symmetrically for the producer under forward integration.

14. Alternatively,  $\lambda$  can be interpreted as the fraction of investment which is incurred at the end of the period by the supplier to fine-tune the quality of the input. The supplier would not undertake this investment in the event of disagreement.

15. It is possible to also allow a secondary market in which the producer can purchase a less suitable input, in which case his outside option would be:

$$O_P^{NI}(e_P, e_S) = (1 - \varphi)(pe_P + 1) + \rho\varphi(pe_P + 1),$$

where  $\rho + \theta < 1$ . This modification has no effect on the results.

determination of  $\theta$  is beyond the scope of our paper. Here it is treated as exogenous and in the empirical section it is proxied by the relative number of producers to suppliers (with more producers, it might be easier for the supplier to find a suitable buyer to her input in the secondary market).

The third organizational form is forward vertical integration (*VIF*), where the supplier owns all the assets. In this case, with a similar reasoning as before, the outside options are

$$O_S^{VIF}(e_P, e_S) = F(x_S = 1, (1 - \lambda')e_P, e_S) \quad \text{and} \quad O_P^{VIF}(e_P, e_S) = 0,$$

where  $\lambda' \in [0, 1)$  is the fraction of the producer’s investment the supplier loses in case of disagreement.

Let  $y_i^z$  denote the output accruing to party  $i$  under organizational form  $z$ . Symmetric Nash bargaining implies that

$$y_i^z(e_P, e_S) = O_i^z(e_P, e_S) + \frac{1}{2} [F(x_S = 1, e_P, e_S) - O_P^z(e_P, e_S) - O_S^z(e_P, e_S)], \tag{4}$$

where the term in square brackets is the relationship-specific surplus over which bargaining takes place, and is positive for all  $z \in \{VIB, NI, VIF\}$ . The important feature is that each party’s share of revenue will be increasing in her own outside option, and decreasing in that of the other party. This feature creates a link between outside options and investment incentives, and through this channel, between organizational forms and investment incentives.

Finally, the utility of party  $i \in \{P, S\}$  can be expressed as

$$U_i^z(y_i(e_P, e_S), e_i) = y_i^z(e_P, e_S) - \Gamma_i(e_i) + T_i(z). \tag{5}$$

### 2.2. Equilibrium

We next characterize the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the game specified in the previous section. Unless otherwise specified, we refer to an equilibrium by the on-the-equilibrium-path actions and revenues,  $(z^*, T_P^*, T_S^*, e_P^*, e_S^*, y_P^*, y_S^*)$ .

It is useful to define the “total surplus” of the relationship as

$$S^z = U_S^z(y_S^z(e_P^*(z), e_S^*(z)), e_S^*(z)) + U_P^z(y_P^z(e_P^*(z), e_S^*(z)), e_P^*(z)),$$

where  $e_i^*(z)$  denotes party  $i$ ’s optimal investment under ownership structure  $z$ , using equations (4) and (5) and the fact that  $T_S(z) + T_P(z) = 0$ , we find the total surplus of the relationship is

$$S^z = F(x_S = 1, e_P^*(z), e_S^*(z)) - \Gamma_P(e_P^*(z)) - \Gamma_S(e_S^*(z)). \tag{6}$$

Because both parties have access to perfect credit markets and ex ante transfers, the subgame perfect equilibrium will always pick the organizational form that maximizes the surplus,  $S$ .<sup>16</sup> In other words,  $S^{z^*} \geq S^z$  for all  $z \in \{VIB, NI, VIF\}$ .<sup>17</sup>

We now characterize the equilibrium by calculating the levels of social surplus under backward integration ( $S^{VIB}$ ), non-integration ( $S^{NI}$ ), and forward integration ( $S^{VIF}$ ). The equilibrium organizational form is then given by

$$z^* = \arg \max_{z \in \{VIB, NI, VIF\}} S^z.$$

Equilibrium investments are determined as the Nash equilibrium of a game where each party chooses its investment so as to maximize utility, given the other party's investment and the ownership structure. More formally, the equilibrium conditional on the ownership structure  $z$  is given by the pair  $\{e_S^*(z), e_P^*(z)\}$  such that

$$e_P^*(z) = \max_{e_P} \{y_P^z(e_P, e_S^*(z)) - \Gamma_P(e_P)\},$$

$$e_S^*(z) = \max_{e_S} \{y_S^z(e_P^*(z), e_S) - \Gamma_S(e_S)\},$$

where the expressions for  $y_i^z(\cdot)$  are given in equation (4), and those for  $\Gamma_P$  and  $\Gamma_S$  are given in equation (2). The Nash equilibrium investment levels under each of the three ownership structures can be calculated as

$$e_P^*(VIB) = p, \quad e_S^*(VIB) = \frac{\lambda}{2}s, \tag{7}$$

$$e_P^*(NI) = \left(1 - \frac{\varphi}{2}\right)p, \quad e_S^*(NI) = \frac{1 + \theta}{2}s, \tag{8}$$

$$e_P^*(VIF) = \frac{\lambda'}{2}p, \quad e_S^*(VIF) = s. \tag{9}$$

These expressions highlight the effect of the different ownership structures on investment incentives. The investment made by the producer is highest under

16. With credit constraints, the less constrained party may become the owner even when this structure does not maximize the ex ante social surplus, because the other party does not have the cash to compensate the first party for giving up ownership (see, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1994a), or Legros and Newman (2008)).

17. Suppose that the equilibrium involves  $z^*$ , but  $S^{z^*} < S^{z'}$ . Then the producer, who has the bargaining power in the first stage of the game, can propose  $z'$  together with a compensating transfer to the supplier, and increase its payoff. Namely, she can offer

$$T_S(z') = T_S(z^*) + y_S^{z^*} - y_S^{z'} - \Gamma_S(e_S^*(z^*)) + \Gamma_S(e_S^*(z')) + \varepsilon$$

with  $\varepsilon > 0$ , which would be at least as attractive for the supplier, and for  $\varepsilon < S^{z'} - S^{z^*}$ , also profitable for the producer, thus yielding a contradiction.

backward vertical integration (i.e.,  $e_p^*(VIB) > e_p^*(NI) > e_p^*(VIF)$ ), whereas that made by the supplier is highest under forward vertical integration (i.e.,  $e_s^*(VIF) > e_s^*(NI) > e_s^*(VIB)$ ).

Most relevant for our empirical analysis are our results that backward vertical integration increases the investment of the producer and reduces the investment of the supplier relative to non-integration. This is a fundamental result in this class of models: Backward vertical integration reduces the supplier's outside option and increases the share of the surplus accruing to the producer. It therefore discourages supplier investment and encourages producer investment. Another important feature is that with non-integration, the investment level of the producer is decreasing in  $\varphi$ , because a greater share of costs increases the scope for holdup by the supplier. Also with non-integration, the investment of the supplier is increasing in  $\theta$  because a greater  $\theta$  provides her with a better outside market (the outside market is irrelevant for the other organizational forms, since one of the parties has residual rights of control over the input and the assets).

Finally, substituting for  $e_s^*(z)$  and  $e_p^*(z)$  in equation (6), we obtain the total surplus under the three ownership structures,  $S^{VIB}$ ,  $S^{NI}$ , and  $S^{VIF}$ , and the comparison of the surpluses gives the following proposition (the relevant expressions and the proof are provided in Appendix A).

**PROPOSITION 1.** *There exist  $\underline{r}$ ,  $\bar{r}$ , and  $\hat{r}$  such that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium ownership structure,  $z^*$ , is given as follows.*

- *If  $\underline{r} < \bar{r}$ , then  $z^* = VIB$  for  $p/s > \bar{r}$ ,  $z^* = NI$  for  $p/s \in (\underline{r}, \bar{r})$ , and  $z^* = VIF$  for  $p/s < \underline{r}$ . Moreover,*

$$\frac{\partial \bar{r}}{\partial \varphi} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \underline{r}}{\partial \varphi} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial \bar{r}}{\partial \theta} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial \underline{r}}{\partial \theta} < 0.$$

- *If  $\underline{r} \geq \bar{r}$ , then  $z^* = VIB$  for  $p/s > \hat{r}$ , and  $z^* = VIF$  for  $p/s < \hat{r}$ . Moreover,*

$$\frac{\partial \hat{r}}{\partial \varphi} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \hat{r}}{\partial \theta} = 0.$$

Proposition 1 summarizes the most important comparative static results that will be empirically investigated in the second part of the paper. Because the empirical analysis will focus on the margin between backward integration and non-integration, we assume henceforth that  $r < \bar{r}$  and restrict the discussion of the comparative statics to this margin.

First, the proposition implies that, given the other parameters, the choice of organizational form depends on  $p$  and  $s$ . When  $p$  is high, or  $s$  is low, backward integration is the equilibrium organizational form. Non-integration emerges when  $p$  is low or  $s$  is high. Intuitively, backward integration becomes more likely when  $p$  is large because, in this case, the tasks in which the producer specializes are

highly “technology intensive” (i.e., the producer’s activity brings more value added), so increasing the producer’s investment is the first priority. Backward vertical integration achieves this by increasing the producer’s outside option and reducing that of the supplier. In contrast, when  $s$  is large, backward integration becomes less likely, because the investment of the supplier is now more important, and by reducing the supplier’s outside option backward integration discourages her investment.

Second, an increase in  $\varphi$  makes backward integration more likely relative to non-integration. A greater share of costs (of the supplier’s inputs in the producer’s total costs) increases the degree to which the producer will be held up by the supplier. Backward vertical integration becomes more preferable because it avoids this problem. In addition, this result also implies that there are important interaction effects: The positive effect of  $p/s$  on backward vertical integration is amplified by  $\varphi$ . To see this let us focus of the comparison between non-integration and backward integration, and denote the surplus difference between these two organizational forms by  $\Delta^B \equiv S^{VIB} - S^{NI}$ . Then we have that

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Delta^B}{\partial \varphi \partial p} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Delta^B}{\partial \varphi \partial s} < 0.$$

This prediction is also quite intuitive. It suggests that when the relationship between the producer and the supplier is less important, their respective technology intensities should have less effect on integration decisions.

Finally, a greater  $\theta$  makes non-integration more likely relative to backward vertical integration; with a greater  $\theta$ , the supplier invests more under non-integration because she has a better outside option, and this makes non-integration a more desirable organizational form. If we interpret  $\theta$  as the degree of competition in the market, this result would imply that, consistent with some of the claims made in the popular press, greater competition encourages non-integration over both backward and forward integration. However, a more appropriate interpretation might be that  $\theta$  is a function of the ratio of producers to suppliers in the market because, with a larger number of producers, the supplier is more likely to find a suitable match in the secondary market after a breakup. In this case, an increase in competition, associated with an increase in the numbers of both suppliers and producers, need not increase non-integration.

### 2.3. Summary and Empirical Hypotheses

We can summarize the most important empirical hypotheses from our framework as follows.

1. Technology intensities of the producer and the supplier should have opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration.

2. These effects should be amplified when the supplier accounts for a larger fraction of the input costs of the producer.
3. Focusing on backward vertical integration, greater technology intensity of the producer, lower technology intensity of the supplier, and greater share of costs of the producer accounted by inputs from the supplier should make vertical integration more likely.
4. Finally, again focusing on backward vertical integration, we may also expect the number of producing firms relative to supplying firms to encourage non-integration.

In light of these empirical hypotheses, we next investigate the potential determinants of vertical integration.

### 3. Data and Measurement

#### 3.1. Vertical Integration

Central to our empirical strategy is a measure of vertical integration. As discussed in the Introduction, to compute such a measure we need to organize the data in a specific way. Motivated by the previous literature, we look at the data from the viewpoint of the producing firm and ask whether for each potential supplying industry that producer is vertically integrated or not. This conceptual exercise amounts to constructing a measure proxying for backward vertical integration (even though because we do not observe which firm/manager has residual rights of control, this is not identical to backward vertical integration in the theory).

More precisely, for each firm  $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ , our first measure is a dummy  $v_{ijk}$  for whether, for each product (industry)  $j = 1, 2, \dots, J$  it is producing, the firm owns a plant in industry  $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$  supplying product  $j$ :

$$v_{ijk} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if firm } i \text{ owns a plant in industry } k \text{ supplying industry } j, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

This measure provides a direct answer to the question of whether each producing firm can supply some of its own input  $k$  necessary for the production of product  $j$ . However, it does not use any information on how much the firm produces in its own plants.

We also construct an alternative (continuous) measure using this information. Let  $c_{ij}$  denote the total cost (including intermediate, capital, and labor costs) of firm  $i$  in producing  $j$ , and  $w_{jk}$  denote the proportion of total costs of producing  $j$  that are made up of input  $k$ , which is obtained from the UK Input–Output Table. We can think of  $c_{ij}w_{jk}$  as the firm's demand for input  $k$  for product  $j$  (to obtain the firm's total demand for  $k$  we sum over  $j$ ). Let  $y_{ik}$  denote the amount of  $k$  that

firm  $i$  produces. The alternative measure of the degree of vertical integration of firm  $i$  in the industry pair  $jk$  is calculated as<sup>18</sup>

$$\bar{v}i_{ijk} = \min \left\{ \frac{y_{ik}}{c_{ij}w_{jk}}, 1 \right\}. \quad (11)$$

When a firm produces several different products that demand input  $k$ , and where the total demand is greater than what can be supplied by the firm itself, we assume that it allocates the input across plants proportionately to their demand, so that the measure becomes

$$\bar{v}i_{ijk} = \min \left\{ \frac{y_{ik}}{\sum_j c_{ij}w_{jk}}, 1 \right\}. \quad (12)$$

In practice, there is little difference between  $v_{ijk}$  and  $\bar{v}i_{ijk}$ , because when a firm owns a plant in a supplying industry, it is typically sufficient to cover all of its input requirements from that industry. So for most of our analysis, we focus on the  $v_{ijk}$  measure.

Our main source of data is the Annual Respondents Database (ARD).<sup>19</sup> This is collected by the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) and firms have a legal obligation to reply. These data provide us with information on input costs and output for each production plant located in the UK at the four-digit industry level and on the ownership structure of these plants.<sup>20</sup> These data do not, however, tell us directly whether a plant purchases inputs from a related plant in the same firm. Data on the demand for intermediate inputs are available at the two-/three-digit industry level from the Input–Output Domestic Use Table. The Input–Output Table contains information on domestic input flows between 77 manufacturing industries, giving 5,929 pairs of producing–supplying industries, 3,840 of which have positive flows. Appendix Table B.1 lists all 77 (supplying) industries together with their largest purchaser and other information.

Because of the level of aggregation of the Input–Output Table, one difficulty arises when we look at industry pairs where the input and output are in the same

18. Davies and Morris (1995) construct a related index with more aggregate data, whereas Fan and Lang (2000) measure corporate relatedness using a similar measure.

19. This data set is constructed using the data from the Annual Business Inquiry from 1998 and onward. Before that the name of the Inquiry was The Annual Census of Production (ACOP). See Griffith (1999) and Barnes and Martin (2002) for a description of these data.

20. Data on employment are available for all plants. Data on other inputs and output are available at the establishment level. An establishment is often a single plant, but can also be a group of plants owned by the same firm that operate in the same four-digit industry. We have input and output data on all establishments with over 100 employees, data from smaller establishments are collected from a random stratified sample and values for non-sampled plants are imputed. Throughout, we exclude single plant firms with fewer than 20 employees.

two-/three-digit industry. In this case, we consider a firm to be vertically integrated only if it has plants in more than one of the four-digit industries within that two-/three-digit industry. Further details on the construction of these measures are provided in Appendix B.

We should emphasize again that all of the measures here are conceptually similar to backward vertical integration. In particular, we are measuring the probability that a producer is vertically integrated with each potential supplier (rather than the probability that a supplier is vertically integrated with each potential producer).

### *3.2. Technology Intensity and the Share of Costs*

Our main measure of technology intensity is R&D intensity, but we also report robustness results using investment intensity. Both these measures are at the industry level rather than at the firm level for two reasons: First, our methodology focuses on the technology of an industry, not on whether a specific firm is more R&D or investment intensive; second, we need measures that apply both to integrated and non-integrated relationships, which naturally takes us to the industry level.

R&D intensity is measured as R&D expenditure divided by total value added.<sup>21</sup> We use R&D data pre-dating the vertical integration sample (1994–1995). The total value added in the denominator includes all firms in the industry (both those performing R&D and those that do not).

R&D intensity is our preferred measure because it is directly related to investment in new technologies. A possible concern is that the distribution of R&D across industries is rather skewed. Another concern might be that R&D could be spuriously correlated with vertical integration; for example, because it is better reported in industries with many large firms and large firms are more likely to be vertically integrated (though, in many specifications, we also control for firm size).

For these reasons, we consider an alternative indicator of industry technology by looking at physical investment intensity. This information is reported at the level of the firm's line of business and can be directly linked to the producing or supplying part of vertically integrated firms. It is also more widely reported and less skewed both within and between industries. As with R&D data, we use data pre-dating the measure of vertical integration, 1992–1995, and aggregate the data from the firm's line of business to the industry level. The disadvantage of this

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21. We have data on R&D and value-added at the firm–industry level. We use these data to construct R&D and value-added by summing over all firm–industry observations in each industry. In the UK these data on R&D are reported separated both by the industry of the firm conducting the R&D and the product category for which the R&D is intended. This enables us to have a more accurate measurement of R&D by producing and supplying industries.

TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Mean (s.d.)	Producer R&D		Supplier R&D	
		low	high	low	high
Mean $\bar{v}_{ijk}$	0.008 (0.087)	0.007 (0.078)	0.010 (0.096)	0.008 (0.084)	0.009 (0.089)
Mean of $v_{ijk}$	0.009 (0.091)	0.009 (0.093)	0.013 (0.114)	0.010 (0.101)	0.011 (0.104)
Firm age	10 (7)	10 (7)	10 (7)	10 (7)	10 (7)
Firm employment	111 (455)	99 (346)	125 (559)	109 (444)	112 (465)
Share of producer costs ( $jk$ )	0.010 (0.034)	0.010 (0.038)	0.010 (0.029)	0.012 (0.040)	0.009 (0.028)
<b>Producing industry</b>					
R&D over value-added	0.027 (0.055)	0.004 (0.002)	0.055 (0.072)	0.026 (0.055)	0.028 (0.055)
Investment over value-added	0.101 (0.041)	0.095 (0.031)	0.109 (0.049)	0.102 (0.040)	0.101 (0.041)
Mean number of firms in industry	5757 (6585)	8267 (7978)	2763 (1635)	5755 (6525)	5759 (6636)
<b>Supplying industry</b>					
R&D over value-added	0.046 (0.107)	0.044 (0.103)	0.050 (0.113)	0.005 (0.003)	0.082 (0.137)
Investment over value added	0.122 (0.057)	0.123 (0.057)	0.122 (0.057)	0.106 (0.038)	0.136 (0.067)
Mean number of firms in industry	2316 (3730)	2320 (3727)	2309 (3733)	3347 (5065)	1433 (1471)

Source: Authors' calculations using the UK ONS data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes:  $\bar{v}_{ijk}$  is a continuous measure of the share of the producers demand that can be met by its own supply.  $v_{ijk}$  is a dummy for whether a firm owns plants in both producing and supplying industries. Share of producer costs ( $jk$ ) is the share of producers in industry  $j$  total costs (including labour and capital) that is on input  $k$  (from the Input–Output Table). The sample contains 2,973,008 observations on 46,392 firms. Numbers reported are means (standard deviations). The first column reports on the whole sample. Subsequent columns split the sample by median producer R&D and supplier R&D intensities.

measure relative to R&D intensity is that physical investment intensity may be less related to technology and may also have a more limited firm-specific component, which is important for the model we have used to motivate our empirical analysis.

The share of costs between each industry pair  $jk$ ,  $sc_{jk}$ , is calculated from the Input–Output Table as the share of inputs from industry  $k$  in the total cost of industry  $j$  (£ of input  $k$  necessary to produce £1 of product  $j$ ).

### 3.3. Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the whole sample, and also for subsamples separated according to whether the producer (supplier) has a high or low R&D intensity. There are 3,840 industry pairs where the Input–Output table indicates that transactions occur. There are 46,392 manufacturing firms with twenty or more employees operating in the UK at some time over the period 1996–2001.

Because individual firms seldom change their organization structure over this short time period we collapse the data into a single cross-section. An observation in our data represents a firm  $i$  producing product  $j$  which uses input  $k$ ; this gives us 2,973,008 observations at the firm–industry pair level.

The first row of Table 1 gives the mean and standard deviation of the continuous measure of vertical integration,  $\bar{v}_{ijk}$ . The mean is 0.008 with a standard deviation of 0.087, which shows that there is substantial variation across firms and at the sub-firm level. There is also substantial variation within industry pairs. To illustrate this, we calculate the average within-industry-pair standard deviation of  $\bar{v}_{ijk}$ , which is 0.086 (not shown in the table). This indicates that, even within a relatively narrow industry-pair, there is as much variation in the extent of vertical integration as in the whole sample.

The low mean of this variable is driven by the large number of zeros. The mean of  $\bar{v}_{ijk}$  conditional on  $\bar{v}_{ijk} > 0$  (not shown) is 0.93. This indicates that if a firm can produce some of its inputs  $k$  in-house, it can typically produce all that input ( $k$ ) necessary for production.<sup>22</sup> This motivates our focus on the simpler dummy variable  $v_{ijk}$ , which indicates whether the firm owns a plant producing input  $k$  which it needs in the production of the product  $j$  (see equation (10)). Not surprisingly, the second row shows that the mean of this variable, 0.009, is very similar to that of  $\bar{v}_{ijk}$ .

The other columns illustrate the differences in the extent of vertical integration when we separate firm–industry pairs by producer R&D intensity and supplier R&D intensity. These differences, which will be investigated in greater detail in the subsequent regression analysis, indicate that vertical integration is higher when the R&D intensity of the producing industry is high. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics do not show any difference between vertical integration when we cut the sample by whether the R&D intensity of the supplying industry is high or low.<sup>23</sup> The regression analysis will show a negative effect of supplier R&D intensity as well as supplier investment intensity on vertical integration, but due to nonlinearities in this relationship (see also Appendix Table B.3), the high–low cut does not show this result.

R&D intensity is positively correlated with investment intensity, although the correlation is quite low (0.251). The relatively weak correlation between these measures means that each measure is an imperfect proxy for the overall technology intensity of the sector, and consequently, there might be some attenuation bias

22. Naturally this does not imply that if a firm is vertically integrated for one of its inputs, it is also vertically integrated for its other inputs. In fact, the mean of  $\sum_k w_{jk} \bar{v}_{ijk}$  conditional on  $\bar{v}_{ijk'} > 0$  for some  $k'$  is 0.053, so on average, across firms that are vertically integrated in any one input, firms are vertically integrated in around 5% of their total inputs demanded.

23. When we group firms on the basis of investment intensity, we see that greater supplier investment intensity is associated with lower vertical integration. This cut of the data is not shown in Table 1 to save space.

TABLE 2. Main results—R&amp;D intensity.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable: $vi_{ijk}$						
Share of costs ( $jk$ )			0.204 (0.029)	0.187 (0.028)	0.187 (0.028)	0.182 (0.027)
R&D intensity, producing ( $j$ ) × Share of costs	0.038 (0.006)		0.040 (0.005)	0.044 (0.005)	0.037 (0.005)	0.030 (0.005)
R&D intensity, supplying ( $k$ ) × Share of costs		-0.010 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.001)	-0.013 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.003)
In Firm size ( $ij$ )					0.0053 (0.0002)	0.0052 (0.0002)
In Firm age ( $ij$ )					0.0010 (0.0001)	0.0009 (0.0001)
In Average firm size, producing ( $j$ )						0.0011 (0.0005)
In Average firm size, supplying ( $k$ )						-0.0036 (0.0004)
In Average firm age, producing ( $j$ )						0.012 (0.003)
In Average firm age, supplying ( $k$ )						0.004 (0.002)

Source: Authors' calculations using the UK ONS data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. There are 2,973,008 observations at the firm–industry pair level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. The right-hand side variables firm size and firm age are measured at the firm–industry pair level in 1996 (age is equal to 1 if the firm enters that industry pair after 1996). R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level R&D data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. Average firm size and age are calculated from the firm–industry pair data and average over the years 1996–2001. In regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample means.

in our estimates of the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration. It also suggests that these measures capture different dimensions of technology intensity, so that it is useful to study the relationship between each of them and vertical integration separately.

Table 1 also shows the means and standard deviations of the other main covariates, defined in Appendix B.

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Benchmark Specification

Table 2 reports the main results. It reports estimates from the following linear probability model:

$$vi_{ijk} = \alpha sc_{jk} + \beta_P RD_j^P + \beta_S RD_k^S + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \boldsymbol{\eta} + \varepsilon_{ijk}, \quad (13)$$

where  $sc_{jk}$  is the share of costs,  $RD_j^P$  is R&D intensity in the producing industry  $j$ ,  $RD_k^S$  is R&D intensity in the supplying industry  $k$ ,  $\mathbf{X}_{ijk}$  is a vector including the constant term and firm and industry characteristics (firm size and age, average firm size and age in producing and supplying industries). The main coefficients of interest are  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta_P$ , and  $\beta_S$ . The regressions are at the firm–industry-pair level, while some of the main regressors are at the (producing or supplying) industry level. For this reason, throughout all standard errors are corrected for clustering at the industry-pair level.<sup>24</sup>

The first two columns of Table 2 consider the bivariate relationship between R&D intensity in the producing and supplying industries and vertical integration. Column (1) shows a positive and highly statistically significant relationship between R&D intensity in the producing industry and vertical integration. The estimate of  $\beta_P$  is 0.038 with a standard error of 0.006. Column (2) shows a negative and highly statistically significant relationship between R&D intensity in the supplying industry and vertical integration; the estimate of  $\beta_S$  is  $-0.010$  (standard error of 0.002). These relationships are robust to the inclusion of other covariates in the rest of the table.

The third column includes both R&D intensity variables and the share of costs. The R&D intensity variables continue to be highly statistically significant, with coefficients close to those in columns (1) and (2) (0.040 and  $-0.007$ ), and the share of costs is positive and also statistically significant. The pattern of opposite signs on R&D intensity of producing and supplying industries is consistent with our first empirical hypothesis discussed in Section 2.3.

Moreover, the directions of the effects of R&D intensities and the share of costs are in line with our third empirical hypothesis, that is, they are consistent with the theory provided that the relevant choice in the data is between backward vertical integration and non-integration. This is reassuring, because we not only believe that this is the case (based on the bulk of evidence in the prior literature) but also because, as explained earlier, we organized the data to have a measure conceptually corresponding to backward vertical integration.

Our second empirical hypothesis from Section 2.3 suggests the possibility of interaction effects between the share of costs and R&D intensity. To investigate this issue, we modify our estimating equation to

24. There is also a potential correlation between observations for the same firm in different industry pairs. Unfortunately, we were unable to estimate a variance–covariance matrix with multiple random effects or multiple levels of clustering, due the large size of the data set. Nevertheless, we believe that the downward bias in the standard errors should be small in our case, because, as noted in footnote 22, the probability of a firm that is vertically integrated for one of her inputs also being integrated for other inputs is relatively small. In any case, in Table 3, we estimate these models including a full set of firm fixed effects (for those firms that operate in more than one industry), which directly removes any potential correlation across firm observations.

TABLE 3. Within-firm variation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	$vi_{ijk}$	$vi_{ijk}$	$vi_{ijk}$	= 1 if multi product	$vi_{ijk}$
Share of costs ( $jk$ )	0.434 (0.054)	0.434 (0.053)	0.414 (0.050)	0.025 (0.094)	0.475 (0.058)
R&D intensity, producing ( $j$ )	0.073 (0.012)	0.024 (0.016)	0.014 (0.017)	0.333 (0.025)	0.030 (0.012)
× Share of costs	2.725 (0.917)	2.786 (0.880)	2.607 (0.816)	-0.058 (1.048)	2.741 (0.915)
R&D intensity, supplying ( $k$ )	-0.041 (0.009)	-0.042 (0.009)	-0.021 (0.008)	0.019 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.005)
× Share of costs	-2.434 (0.897)	-2.543 (0.865)	-2.303 (0.786)	0.914 (0.990)	-2.482 (0.891)
In Firm size ( $ij$ )			0.0024 (0.0004)	0.0044 (0.0008)	
In Firm age ( $ij$ )			0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0076 (0.0007)	
In Average firm size, producing ( $j$ )			0.003 (0.002)	0.014 (0.005)	
In Average firm size, supplying ( $k$ )			-0.012 (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.0042)	
In Average firm age, producing ( $j$ )			-0.006 (0.010)	0.352 (0.021)	
In Average firm age, supplying ( $k$ )			0.017 (0.005)	-0.0019 (0.0224)	
Observations	891,942	891,942	891,942	2,973,008	891,942
Fixed effects	no	6,713 firms	6,713 firms	no	no

Source: Authors' calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: In columns (1)–(3) and (5) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. In column (4) the dependent variable is whether or not the observations are for a multiplant firm. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. In regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample means.

$$vi_{ijk} = \alpha sc_{jk} + (\beta_P + \gamma_P sc_{jk})RD_j^P + (\beta_S + \gamma_S sc_{jk})RD_k^S + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk}\eta + \varepsilon_{ijk}, \quad (14)$$

with  $\gamma_P$  and  $\gamma_S$  as the additional coefficients of interest. Theory suggests that  $\gamma_P$  should have the same sign as  $\beta_P$ , and that  $\gamma_S$  should have the same sign as  $\beta_S$ , so that the effects of R&D intensity in producing and supplying industries should be amplified when there is a greater share of costs. Throughout, when including interaction terms, we report the main effects evaluated at the sample mean, so that these estimates are comparable to those in the models without interaction effects.

The estimates in column (4) are consistent with the theoretical predictions. The main effects are close to those in the previous columns, and the interaction effects are large and statistically significant:  $\gamma_P$  is positive (1.112 with a standard error of 0.402), while  $\gamma_S$  is negative (−0.909 with a standard error of 0.353).

Columns (5) and (6) add a number of characteristics at the firm-line of business and industry level, namely firm size and age (in that line of business), and average firm size and average firm age in producing and supplying industries. All five coefficients of interest are robust, and remain close to their baseline values (the only minor exception is  $\beta_P$ , which declines from 0.040 in column (3) to 0.030 in column (6)). The coefficients on the controls are also interesting. They indicate, for example, that larger and older firms are more likely to be vertically integrated, which is plausible. Furthermore, greater average firm size in the producing industry makes vertical integration more likely, while average firm size in the supplying industry appears to reduce the probability of integration. This opposite pattern of coefficients, with firm size in the producing industry having a positive effect, is also consistent with our conjecture that the relevant margin in the data is backward integration.

Overall, the results in Table 2 show an interesting pattern of opposite-signed effects from technology intensity in producing and supplying industries (which is consistent with our first empirical hypothesis in Section 2.3). They also show that these effects are magnified when the share of costs accounted for by the supplying industry in the total costs of the producing industry is large (which is consistent with our second empirical hypothesis). In addition, the direction of the effects is also consistent with our measurement strategy and the theory provided that the relevant margin in the data is backward vertical integration (our third empirical hypothesis).

Before further investigating the robustness of our findings, it is useful to discuss the economic magnitudes of the estimates in Table 2. The implied magnitude of the main effects is very small. For example, the coefficient of  $-0.013$  in column (4) of Table 2 suggests that a one standard deviation (0.107) increase in the R&D intensity of supplying industry reduces the probability of vertical integration by slightly more than 0.1% ( $-0.013 \times 0.107 \approx -0.001$ ). However, this small effect applies at the mean of the distribution of share of costs, which is 0.010. If, instead, we evaluate the effect at the 90th percentile of the share of cost distribution, which is about 0.20, then the overall effect is much larger; again using the numbers from column (4), a one standard deviation increase in supplier R&D intensity leads to almost a 2% decrease in the probability of vertical integration ( $-0.001 + [-0.909 \times 0.19 \times 0.107] \approx 0.02$ ). Similarly, the impact of producer R&D intensity is small when evaluated at the mean, about 0.2%, ( $0.037 \times 0.055 \approx 0.002$ ), but sizable, 1.4%, when evaluated at higher levels of share of costs ( $0.002 + [1.104 \times 0.19 \times 0.055] \approx 0.014$ ).

This pattern is in fact quite sensible. For the vast majority of industry pairs, the scale of the relationship between the producer and the supplier is so small that it would be surprising if technology intensity were of any great importance for integration decisions. Our theory should instead be relevant for industry pairs where the scale of the relationship (as measured by the share of costs) is large,

and this is exactly where we see a significant positive effect of the R&D intensity of producing industries and a significant negative effect of the R&D intensity of supplying industries. This discussion also implies that the interaction effects are as important as the main effects for the relevance of the pattern documented here.

#### **4.2. Within-Firm Variation**

A more demanding test of the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration is to investigate whether a particular firm is more likely to be vertically integrated in producing industries that are more technologically intensive and with supplying industries that are less technology intensive. This is done by estimating a model including firm fixed effects.

Naturally, this can only be investigated using multiplant firms, namely, those that produce in more than one industry, which introduces a potential selection bias. At some level, this is mechanical; vertically integrated firms have to be multiplant firms. More generally, producer and supplier technology intensity may affect the likelihood of being a multiplant firm differentially, and if so, regressions on the subsample of multiplant firms may lead to biased estimates of the effect of technology (R&D) intensity on vertical integration.

In Table 3, we investigate both the robustness of our results to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and potential selection issues.

Column (1) reports our basic specification (without fixed effects) on multiplant firms only. Comparing this to column (4) of Table 2, a number of features are noteworthy. First, the number of observations is now 891,942 rather than 2,973,008 as in Table 2. Second, despite changes in coefficient estimates, the overall pattern is quite similar. In particular, there is a positive effect of producer R&D intensity and a negative effect of supplier R&D intensity on vertical integration. Both these effects are larger than those in Table 2. The interaction effects also have the expected signs. This pattern of results is reassuring, because it shows that our main results in Table 2 were not driven by the contrast of single to multiplant firms. Within multiplant firms, those with greater producer R&D intensity are also more likely to be vertically integrated, while those with greater supplier R&D intensity are less likely to be vertically integrated.

Column (2) adds a full set of firm fixed effects to the specification in column (1). This has surprisingly little effect on the results. The coefficients on the share of cost, the interaction between producer R&D intensity and share of cost, supplier R&D intensity and the interaction between share of costs and supplier R&D intensity, are essentially identical to those in column (1). The only change is in the main effect of producer R&D intensity, which falls from 0.073 to 0.024 and is no longer statistically significant.

However, it is important to emphasize that even though producer R&D intensity is insignificant when evaluated at the mean, the overall pattern is not very

different; due to the significant interaction effect, producing industries with substantial R&D intensity are much more likely to vertically integrate activities that are important for their products. In fact, because the interaction effect is larger than in Table 2, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in producer R&D intensity on the probability of vertical integration for a pair at the 90th percentile of the share of costs distribution is now greater than in Table 2 at 3% ( $0.03 \times 0.055 + [2.741 \times 0.19 \times 0.055] \approx 0.030$ ), rather than 1.4% when using the estimates from column (5) of Table 2. Similarly, now a one-standard deviation increase in supplier R&D intensity has a larger effect, 5% ( $-0.016 \times 0.107 + [-2.482 \times 0.19 \times 0.107] \approx 0.052$ ), rather than 2% when using the estimate from column (5) of Table 2.

Column (3) repeats the model of column (2) including the full set of covariates. The results are similar to those in column (2), except that the coefficients on the level of producer and supplier R&D decline.

These specifications do not deal with the potential selection problem. In columns (4) and (5) we estimate a standard Heckman selection model. Column (4) shows estimates from the probit model of the probability of a firm being a multiproduct firm as a function of the full set of variables used to explain vertical integration. Among the main variables of interest, only the R&D intensity of the producing industry turns out to have an effect on the probability of a firm of being multiproduct, whereas the share of costs, R&D intensity of the supplying industry, and the interaction of producer and supplier R&D intensities with the share of costs appear to have no influence on multiplant status. This implies that the R&D intensity of the producing industry is most likely to suffer from a bias due to endogenous selection (interestingly, this is the only coefficient for which the estimate changed substantially after the introduction of firm fixed effects).

Column (5) shows the second stage of whether a firm is vertically integrated, conditional on being a multiplant firm. The second-stage equation excludes the firm and industry characteristics.<sup>25</sup> Given the pattern in column (4), it is not surprising that the most remarkable change occurs in the main effect of the producer R&D intensity which is now larger (0.030) and statistically significant (standard error 0.012). The main effect of the supplier R&D becomes smaller (in absolute value), but remains highly significant.

In summary, Table 3 subjects our basic specification to a more demanding test by including a full set of firm fixed effects. These fixed effects control for various unobserved firm characteristics which may be potentially correlated with the propensity to become integrated. These specifications still show a negative effect of supplier R&D, and a positive (sometimes significant, and sometimes

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25. This implies that the selection results have to be interpreted with caution, because there are various natural reasons for why firm and industry characteristics may need to be in the second stage. Unfortunately, we do not have any natural exclusion restrictions that can be exploited in this regression.

insignificant) effect of producer R&D. Most importantly, all of these specifications show large, statistically significant, and opposite-signed interaction effects between producer and supplier R&D intensities and the share of costs.

**4.3. An Instrumental Variables Strategy**

So far, the results point to statistically significant associations between vertical integration and the technology intensity in the producing and supplying industries. However, these associations do not necessarily correspond to the causal effects of the technology intensity variables on vertical integration decisions. First, as highlighted by the theory, vertical integration also affects investment in technology, so that there is scope for reverse causality. Second, there may be other variables that are omitted from the regressions, which have a causal effect on both technology intensity and vertical integration. This will mean that the error term is correlated with the regressors and will lead to biased estimates of the coefficients of interest. To the extent that the omitted variables are at the firm level, this is controlled for by the within-firm estimates shown herein, but there may still be omitted variables at the firm–industry level affecting the estimates.

A more satisfactory approach would be to use an instrumental variable strategy, with instruments that affect technology intensity, without influencing vertical integration through other channels (i.e., they should be orthogonal to the error term,  $\varepsilon_{ijk}$ , in equations (13) and (14)). Although we do not have such perfect instruments, measures of technology intensity in the same industry in the U.S. are potential candidates. These instruments are useful in avoiding the potential reverse causality problems and in removing the effect of UK-specific omitted variables, although this procedure would not help with omitted industry-specific variables that are common across the U.S. and the UK. Therefore, these results should not necessarily be interpreted as causal estimates, but as estimates investigating a different source of variation in the data.

Because we do not have U.S. data on R&D intensity at the same level of disaggregation, we use the investment intensity of the corresponding supplying and producing sector in the United States (at the same two-/three-digit industry) as the instrument for R&D intensity. The first-stage equations for the model in equation (13) are

$$\begin{aligned}
 RD_j^P &= \pi_1^P sc_{jk} + \mathbf{Z}'_{jk} \boldsymbol{\pi}_2^P + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \boldsymbol{\eta}^P + u_{ijk}^P, \\
 RD_k^S &= \pi_1^S sc_{jk} + \mathbf{Z}'_j \boldsymbol{\pi}_2^S + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \boldsymbol{\eta}^S + u_{ijk}^S,
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{15}$$

where the  $\mathbf{Z}_{jk}$ s is the vector of instruments for technology intensity in the supplying and producing industries (in other words, investment intensity in the supplying and producing industries in the U.S.), and  $\boldsymbol{\pi}_2^P$  and  $\boldsymbol{\pi}_2^S$  are vectors of parameters.

TABLE 4. Instrumental variables.

Dependent variable: $vi_{ijk}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of costs ( $jk$ )	0.183 (0.028)	0.054 (0.069)	-0.085 (0.081)	0.210 (0.134)
R&D intensity, producing ( $j$ ) × Share of costs	0.492 (0.061)	0.627 (0.077)	-1.025 (0.239)	0.418 (0.246)
		9.832 (4.207)	29.763 (6.773)	22.288 (7.977)
R&D intensity, supplying ( $k$ ) × Share of costs	-0.158 (0.014)	-0.202 (0.031)	-0.497 (0.089)	-1.158 (0.198)
		-7.519 (3.733)	-16.872 (4.884)	-8.561 (6.042)
<b>First stage producing industry R&amp;D intensity</b>				
U.S. producing industry investment intensity × Share of costs	0.172 (0.029)	0.177 (0.029)	-0.059 (0.027)	-0.158 (0.017)
		0.786 (0.814)	0.506 (0.580)	0.333 (0.429)
U.S. supplying industry investment intensity × Share of costs	0.011 (0.022)	0.009 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.013)
		-1.121 (0.515)	-0.576 (0.365)	-0.363 (0.261)
$F$ -stat $p$ -value	0.000	0.000	0.091	0.000
$R^2$	0.007	0.007	0.175	0.487
<b>First stage supplying industry R&amp;D intensity</b>				
U.S. producing industry investment intensity × Share of costs	-0.028 (0.082)	-0.010 (0.081)	-0.033 (0.084)	-0.040 (0.083)
		4.272 (1.436)	3.812 (1.034)	4.207 (1.521)
U.S. supplying industry investment intensity × Share of costs	0.366 (0.060)	0.356 (0.60)	0.093 (0.056)	0.063 (0.056)
		-3.635 (1.136)	-3.268 (1.046)	-3.254 (1.188)
$F$ -stat ( $p$ -value)	0.000	0.000	0.015	0.029
$R^2$	0.024	0.024	0.069	0.065
Observations	2,973,008	2,973,008	2,973,008	891,942
Fixed effects	no	no	no	yes
covariates	no	no	yes	yes

Source: Authors' calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. Covariates included in columns (3) and (4) are: producing firm size, age, mean firm size, and mean firm age in producing and supplying industries. R&D intensity is R&D and investment carried out in the UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. In regression with interactions, all main effects evaluated at sample means. Instruments are investment intensity in the same industry in the U.S.

In column (1) of Table 4, we start with instrumental variables (IV) estimates of equation (13). The top panel shows the second-stage results, and the lower panels report the first-stage coefficients from equation (15) as well as the  $R^2$  and the  $p$ -value of the  $F$ -statistics for the significance of the instruments in the first stage. The first-stage relationships are highly significant, and show a very

appealing pattern: Producer investment technology intensity in the U.S. is correlated with producer R&D intensity in the UK, but not with the supplier technology intensity in the UK. The pattern is similar (i.e., the coefficients are reversed) for supplier technology intensity in the U.S. This gives us confidence that the IV estimates are capturing a useful source of variation.

The second stage estimates in column (1) are interesting: The producer R&D intensity is positive and supplier R&D intensity is negative. Both estimates are highly significant and much larger than the OLS estimates. The larger IV estimates for the main effects of the technology intensity variables likely reflects the fact that the IV procedure is reducing the attenuation bias in the OLS estimates resulting from classical measurement error. This type of attenuation bias might be quite important here, because our measures of technology (R&D) intensity are highly imperfect proxies for the importance of relationship-specific technology investments. Another possible interpretation is that, consistent with the significant interactions between technology intensity and the share of costs, which show heterogeneous effects conditional on observables, there are also heterogeneous effects conditional on unobservables. In that case, because OLS and IV have different weighting functions, it is natural that they will lead to different estimates (see Angrist and Imbens 1995). In any case, we interpret these results as supportive of the main prediction of our theory.

For the model in equation (14), we have four first-stage equations, which are

$$\begin{aligned}
 RD_j^P &= \pi_1^P sc_{jk} + \mathbf{Z}'_{jk} \pi_2^P + (sc_{jk} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_{jk})' \pi_3^P + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \eta^P + u_{ijk}^P, \\
 RD_j^P \cdot sc_{jk} &= \pi_1^{PC} sc_{jk} + \mathbf{Z}'_{jk} \pi_2^{PC} + (sc_{jk} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_{jk})' \pi_3^{PC} + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \eta^{PC} + u_{ijk}^{PC}, \\
 RD_j^S &= \pi_1^S sc_{jk} + \mathbf{Z}'_{jk} \pi_2^S + (sc_{jk} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_{jk})' \pi_3^S + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \eta^S + u_{ijk}^S, \\
 RD_j^S \cdot sc_{jk} &= \pi_1^{SC} sc_{jk} + \mathbf{Z}'_{jk} \pi_2^{SC} + (sc_{jk} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_{jk})' \pi_3^S + \mathbf{X}'_{ijk} \eta^{SC} + u_{ijk}^{SC},
 \end{aligned}$$

where, for example,  $RD_j^P \cdot sc_{jk}$  is the interaction between producer R&D intensity and share of cost, and  $(sc_{jk} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_{jk})'$  denotes the interaction between the vector of instruments and the share of cost.

In columns (2)–(4) of Table 4 we report IV estimates based on these (to save space, in the bottom panel we report only the two first-stage equations for the main effects).<sup>26</sup> Whereas the instrumental variable strategy works reasonably well for the main effects, instrumenting for the interaction effects is more challenging, because instruments constructed by interacting the original instruments with the share of costs are highly correlated with the instruments for the main effects. In column (2), we report estimates where both main effects and interaction terms are

26. Given the size of the data set, all IV estimates are implemented using the “control function” approach, which involves including the residuals from the first stages as additional regressors in the second stage (see, for example, Wooldridge 2002, chapter 18).

instrumented. The main effect estimates are similar to those in column (1), but the interaction estimates are quite large and imprecisely estimated (though still statistically significant). This reflects the difficulty of simultaneously instrumenting for main effects and interaction effects that are mechanically correlated.<sup>27</sup> In column (3), we add our usual set of covariates to this specification. Now the multicollinearity issue becomes worse and the main effect of producer R&D intensity turns negative, and the interaction terms are even larger and more imprecisely estimated. Finally, in column (4), we add fixed effects. Interestingly, in this case, the estimates are more similar to those in column (2).

Overall, the IV estimates using the U.S. values as instruments for UK producer and supplier R&D intensity are mixed. When we only instrument the main effects, the results confirm the overall picture emerging from the OLS regressions. When we also instrument the interaction terms, there is too much multicollinearity to learn much from the estimates.

## 5. Robustness

In this section we consider a number of robustness checks. First, we investigate whether the use of a linear probability model versus a probit model matters for the results. Second, we report results using our alternative measure of technology intensity, which uses information on physical investment. Finally, we consider a number of other robustness checks. In Appendix B, we also check the robustness of our main results in various subsamples and investigate the role of nonlinearities.<sup>28</sup>

### 5.1. Probit Estimates versus Linear Probability Models

Tables 2–4 use linear probability models. These have a number of attractive features, including being easier to interpret and estimate (for example, with large samples and individual fixed effects). Nevertheless, it is important to investigate whether alternative estimation strategies lead to similar results. This issue is addressed in Table 5.

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27. As an additional experiment, we used only the control functions from the two levels equations, which essentially amounts to only instrumenting for the main effects. This yields results that are much more favorable to our hypothesis and similar to the OLS. For example, the coefficient estimates for the main effects and interactions of producer and supplier R&D in the equivalent specification to column (2) are, respectively, 0.509 (s.e = 0.061), 1.126 (s.e = 0.401), -0.164 (s.e = 0.015), and -0.958 (s.e = 0.352).

28. We also investigated the stability of the basic relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration over years, and the results are stable across years (details available upon request). In addition, we estimated specifications controlling for the share of the output of the supplying industry going to the producing industry in question. When entered by itself, this variable is significant with the expected sign, but when entered together with the share of cost, it is no longer significant and typically has the opposite of the sign predicted by our model (the results are available upon request, and see also footnote 11).

TABLE 5. LPM and probit.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	LPM	PROBIT	PROBIT	LPM	PROBIT	PROBIT	LPM	PROBIT	PROBIT
Dependent variable: $v_{ijk}$		marginal effects <sup>a</sup>	mean of marginal effects <sup>b</sup>		marginal effects <sup>a</sup>	mean of marginal effects <sup>b</sup>		marginal effects <sup>a</sup>	mean of marginal effects <sup>b</sup>
Share of costs ( $j/k$ )	0.204 (0.029)	0.090 (0.007)	0.094 min 0.044 max 1.087	0.187 (0.028)	0.088 (0.007)	0.092 min 0.014 max 1.059	0.182 (0.027)	0.072 (0.006)	0.087 min 0.002 max 1.306
R&D intensity, producing ( $j$ )	0.040 (0.005)	0.027 (0.002)	0.029 min 0.014 max 0.331	0.044 (0.005)	0.024 (0.003)	0.026 min 0.004 max 0.293	0.030 (0.005)	0.010 (0.002)	0.013 min 0.0003 max 0.188
× Share of costs				1.112 (0.402)	0.293 (0.126)	0.572 min 0.146 max 14.104	1.067 (0.374)	0.171 (0.080)	0.337 min 0.007 max 8.230
R&D intensity, supplying ( $k$ )	-0.007 (0.001)	-0.009 (0.002)	-0.010 min -0.114 max -0.005	-0.013 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.009 min -0.101 max -0.001	-0.007 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 min -0.011 max -0.00001
× Share of costs				-0.909 (0.353)	-0.271 (0.149)	-0.384 min -7.189 max 0.027	-0.871 (0.324)	-0.140 (0.099)	-0.199 min -4.298 max -0.004
Covariates	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. Covariates included in columns (7)–(9) are: producing firm size, age, mean firm size and mean firm age in producing and supplying industries. R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level.

<sup>a</sup>Evaluated at mean value of explanatory variables. <sup>b</sup>Calculated for each individual observation using Ai and Norton (2004) formula.

Specifically, Table 5 compares estimates from the linear probability model and the probit model. Column (1) repeats column (3) from Table 2. Column (2) reports marginal effects from a probit model evaluated at the mean value of all right-hand side variables. Column (3) reports the mean, minimum, and maximum values of the marginal effects (from the same probit model as in column (2)). Columns (4)–(6) repeat this for the specification shown in column (4) of Table 2 and columns (7)–(9) for the specification shown in column (6) of Table 2. The marginal effects of the interaction terms are calculated using the formula given by Ai and Norton (2003).

These results show that, on the whole, our main results are not sensitive to the choice of functional form. With probit, the main effect for producer R&D intensity is somewhat smaller, but similar and statistically significant (e.g., compare column (2) to column (1)). For the interaction effects, the probit results are substantially smaller when the marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. However, more interesting is the mean of the marginal effects, reported in columns (6) and (9); here, the interaction effects are larger, though still smaller than the linear probability models. These columns also show that the range of estimates includes much larger interaction effects. Therefore, our interpretation of the somewhat smaller interaction effects in the probit estimation is that the nonlinearity in the probit specification is giving us information about a different part of the distribution of heterogeneous effects.

Overall, despite some differences in magnitudes, these results are generally supportive of the patterns shown in Tables 2–4.

## 5.2. *Results with Investment Intensity*

Our alternative measure of technology intensity uses information on physical investments instead of R&D. Even though greater physical investment need not be associated with more specific investments, we expect firms making more investments overall to also undertake greater investments in technology and relationship-specific assets. In this light, it would be reassuring if the results were similar when using the investment intensity measure of technology.

Table 6 repeats the benchmark regressions of Table 2 using our alternative measure of technology intensity. Overall, the results point to a similar pattern: investment intensity in the producing industry is positively associated with vertical integration, and investment intensity in the supplying industry is negatively associated with integration. For example, column (3) shows a coefficient of 0.030 (standard error = 0.006) on producer technology intensity, and the coefficient on supplier technology intensity is  $-0.046$  (standard error = 0.004).

The exception to this pattern is for producer investment intensity when the full set of additional covariates are included. In this case producer technology

TABLE 6. Alternative technology measure—investment intensity.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable: $vi_{ijk}$						
Share of costs ( $jk$ )			0.203 (0.028)	0.191 (0.023)	0.191 (0.023)	0.187 (0.024)
Investment intensity, producing ( $j$ )	0.027 (0.007)		0.030 (0.006)	0.038 (0.006)	0.021 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.008)
× Share of costs				1.488 (0.456)	1.471 (0.460)	1.402 (0.453)
Investment intensity, supplying ( $k$ )		-0.050 (0.004)	-0.046 (0.004)	-0.055 (0.005)	-0.055 (0.005)	-0.041 (0.005)
× Share of costs				-1.681 (0.490)	-1.666 (0.487)	-1.562 (0.489)
ln Firm size ( $ij$ )					0.0054 (0.0002)	0.0052 (0.0002)
ln Firm age ( $ij$ )					0.0009 (0.0001)	0.0008 (0.0001)
ln Average firm size, producing ( $j$ )						0.0023 (0.0006)
ln Average firm size, supplying ( $k$ )						-0.0024 (0.0004)
ln Average firm age, producing ( $j$ )						0.011 (0.003)
ln Average firm age, supplying ( $k$ )						0.004 (0.002)

Source: Authors' calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. There are 2,973,008 observations at the firm–industry pair level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. Investment intensity is investment carried out in the UK divided by value added produced in the UK, taken from plant level investment data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. Firm size and firm age are measured at the firm–industry pair level in 1996 (age is equal to 1 if the firm enters that industry pair after 1996). Average firm size and age are calculated from the firm–industry pair data and average over the years 1996–2001. In regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample means.

intensity is no longer statistically significant. Nevertheless, there continues to be a positive, significant, and large effect of the interaction between producer investment intensity and the share of costs. Consequently, producer technology intensity has no effect on vertical integration when evaluated at the mean share of cost, but has a substantial effect when the share of cost is large (e.g., at the 90th percentile). Supplier technology intensity continues to be highly significant, both at the mean and for large shares of costs.<sup>29</sup>

29. We also repeated our other robustness checks using investment intensity. The results are generally similar to those with R&D intensity. For example, with firm fixed effects, producer investment intensity loses significance when we include fixed effects, but once we control for selection as in column (5) of Table 3, we recover an estimate very similar to that in Table 6. Similarly, instrumental variable estimates show a similar pattern to those with R&D intensity. These results are available upon request.

### 5.3. Other Robustness Checks

The rest of the robustness checks are presented in the Appendix.

Appendix Table B.2 reports estimates from the specification including all the covariates as in column (6) of Table 2 for two subsamples (we do not report the coefficients on the covariates to save space). In the first column, we show the results excluding the bottom quartile of firms by size, in the second column we exclude the top quartile by size. These models are useful to check whether our results are driven by the comparison of large to small firms. The results hold up in these subsamples.

In column (3), we use our alternative measure of vertical integration,  $\overline{v}_{ijk}$ . The results are very similar to those using the vertical integration dummy,  $v_{ijk}$ . In particular, producer R&D intensity has a positive and significant effect on vertical integration and supplier R&D intensity has a negative effect. The interaction effects are significant and have opposite signs as in our baseline estimates.

Finally, Appendix Table B.3 considers potential nonlinearities. It reports results with dummies for share of cost, and a producing (or supplying) industry being at the second, third, or fourth quartile of the corresponding distribution (with the first quartile as the omitted group). The results show that there is generally a monotonic pattern, consistent with the linear regressions reported in previous tables, with the exception of the effect of R&D intensity in the supplying industry. Here the second quartile has the largest negative effect, and the third quartile has a small, and sometimes insignificant, sometimes positive effect. This nonlinear pattern, for which we do not have a good explanation, is the reason why the difference in vertical integration by the R&D intensity of the suppliers was not visible in the descriptive statistics in Table 1.

## 6. Outside Options and Competition

Finally, we now briefly look at the fourth empirical hypothesis suggested by our model, which concerns potential links between competition and vertical integration (recall Section 2.3). In Table 7, we briefly investigate this relationship using the number of firms in producing and supplying industries as our main indicator of competition. The table shows that a greater number of firms in the producing industry is associated with lower vertical integration, whereas a greater number of firms in the supplying industry leads to more vertical integration. When we include fixed effects (columns (2) and (4)), the effect of the number of firms in the producing industry is no longer significant, but the effect of the number of firms in the supplying industry remains significant and of a similar magnitude to the estimate without fixed effects.

TABLE 7. Outside option.

Dependent variable: $vi_{ijk}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Technology measure = R&D intensity		Technology measure = Investment intensity	
Share of costs ( $jk$ )	0.154 (0.027)	0.328 (0.042)	0.161 (0.024)	0.359 (0.039)
technology, producing ( $j$ )	0.029 (0.005)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.007)	-028 (0.027)
× Share of costs	0.863 (0.338)	1.571 (0.628)	1.352 (0.440)	0.358 (1.330)
technology, supplying ( $k$ )	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.031 (0.005)	-0.073 (0.014)
× Share of costs	-0.762 (0.287)	-1.313 (0.595)	-1.282 (0.475)	0.400 (1.129)
In Firm size ( $ij$ )	0.0052 (0.0002)	0.0024 (0.0004)	0.0052 (0.0002)	0.0023 (0.0004)
In Firm age ( $ij$ )	0.0009 (0.0001)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0009 (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.0005)
In Average firm size, producing ( $j$ )	-0.0012 (0.0006)	0.016 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.0006)	0.003 (0.002)
In Average firm size, supplying ( $k$ )	-0.0022 (0.0004)	-0.0018 (0.0010)	0.0029 (0.0005)	0.0008 (0.0011)
In Average firm age, producing ( $j$ )	0.010 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.009)
In Average firm age, supplying ( $k$ )	0.017 (0.002)	0.021 (0.005)	0.017 (0.002)	0.023 (0.005)
In number of firms, producing ( $j$ )	-0.0018 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.0009)	-0.0019 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (-0.0009)
In number of firms, supplying ( $k$ )	0.0055 (0.0003)	0.019 (0.002)	0.0053 (0.0003)	0.019 (0.002)
Observations	2,973,008	891,942	2,973,008	891,942
Fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes

Source: Authors' calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. R&D and investment intensity are R&D and investment in the UK divided by value added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. Firm size and firm age are measured at the firm–industry pair level in 1996 (age is equal to 1 if the firm enters that industry pair after 1996). Average firm size and age are averages over the years 1996–2001. In regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample mean.

It is also noteworthy that the coefficient on the number of firms in the supplying industry is about four times the magnitude of the coefficient for the number of firms in the producing industry. Ignoring this difference in magnitude, for which we do not have any good explanation, these results are consistent with the theory, where we showed that as long as the relevant margin is backward integration, a greater  $\theta$ , which increases the outside option of the supplier, should make vertical integration less likely. A greater number of firms in the producing industry is likely to increase the supplier's outside option, whereas more

firms in the supplying industry should reduce it. This is the pattern we find in the data.<sup>30</sup>

Interestingly, if we think of an increase in overall competition as corresponding to a proportional increase in the number of producing and supplying firms, since the coefficient on the number of supplying firms is larger, our estimates suggest that there should be an increase in vertical integration. Although this result is not our main focus, it sheds some doubt on the popular claims that greater (global or national) competition necessarily leads to less integrated firms.

## 7. Summary and Conclusions

Despite a number of well-established theories and a prominent public debate on the effect of technology and technical change on the internal organization of the firm, there is little evidence on the determinants of vertical integration. This paper proposes a new approach to investigate the predictions of the PRT approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). This approach relies on comparing vertical integration patterns across pairs of industries (products). We use data from the entire population of UK manufacturing plants, and document a number of empirical regularities in the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration.

Our results show that vertical integration in a pair of industries is less likely when the supplying industry is more technology intensive and the producing industry is less technology intensive. Moreover, both these effects are larger when inputs from the supplying industry constitute a large fraction of the total costs of the producing industry. This pattern of opposite effects of technology intensity of producing and supplying industries is consistent with the PRT approach. In addition, the direction of these effects, for example, that vertical integration is more likely when the producing industry is more technology intensive, and the other patterns we document, are consistent with the theory, provided that the relevant margin in the data is the choice between backward vertical integration and non-integration.

We report similar results controlling for firm fixed effects and instrumenting UK technology intensity measures with U.S. measures. We also show the robustness of our results to a variety of other specifications.

Finally, we find that vertical integration is more likely when the average number of producing firms is greater relative to the average number of supplying firms, which is also consistent with the theoretical predictions we derived from

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30. We also experimented with Hirfindahl indices for producing and supplying industries. Although the Hirfindahl indices were sometimes significant, the results were not robust. The addition of the Hirfindahl indices did not change the effects of the number of firms in the producing and supplying industries on vertical integration, however. Also, these results are robust to using physical investments instead of R&D as a measure of technology intensity.

a simple incomplete contracts model (and not entirely consistent with the claims made in the popular press about the effect of competition on the structure of firms).

The results in this paper provide a number of empirical patterns that may be useful for theories of vertical integration to confront. Although our empirical investigation is motivated by a specific theoretical approach (the PRT), the empirical patterns we document should be of more general interest and may be consistent with various alternative theories. Nevertheless, the current versions of the most popular alternative approaches are not easily reconciled with the findings. For example, the emphasis of Williamson's TCE approach that vertical integration circumvents holdup problems would be consistent with the positive association between vertical integration and producer technology intensity, but not with the negative effect of supplier technology intensity. Theories based on supply assurance (e.g., Green 1986; Bolton and Whinston 1993) could also account for part of the results if more technology-intensive firms require more assurance. But these theories do not provide an explanation for why greater technology intensity of suppliers is associated with less vertical integration. Theories based on securing intellectual property rights (e.g., Aghion and Tirole 1994b) could account for both main effects of producer and supplier technology intensity, for example, because creating a vertically integrated structure may provide better protection of intellectual property rights. These theories would not explain why these effects become stronger when the share of costs is high. A theoretical investigation of various alternative explanations for these patterns, as well as further empirical analysis of the robustness of these results with data from other countries, appear to be interesting areas for future research.

Finally, as noted previously, we organized the data in this paper so as to measure the likelihood of a firm being integrated with one or multiple input suppliers. This makes our measure of vertical integration conceptually similar to backward vertical integration. In this light, the fact that our results are consistent with the theory when the relevant choice is between backward vertical integration and non-integration is reassuring. It would be interesting to construct empirical measures that are closer to forward vertical integration and investigate the empirical determinants of backward and forward vertical integration simultaneously. We believe that a more systematic investigation (and measurement) of joint determination of backward and forward integration, and how they interact with industry structure, are promising areas for future research.

## **Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1**

Substituting the optimal investments given by equations (7), (8), and (9) into equation (6), social surplus under the three organizational forms is obtained as

$$\begin{aligned}
 S^{VIB} &= 1 + \frac{1}{2}p^2 + \frac{\varphi}{2}\lambda \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{4}\right) s^2, \\
 S^{NI} &= 1 + \left(1 - \frac{2 - \varphi}{4}\right) \left(1 - \frac{\varphi}{2}\right) p^2 + \frac{\varphi}{2}(1 + \theta) \left(1 - \frac{1 + \theta}{4}\right) s^2, \quad (\text{A.1}) \\
 S^{VIF} &= 1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda' \left(1 - \frac{\lambda'}{4}\right) p^2 + \frac{\varphi}{2}s^2.
 \end{aligned}$$

Let

$$\Delta^B \equiv S^{VIB} - S^{NI} = \varphi^2 p^2/8 - (3 - \theta - \lambda)(1 + \theta - \lambda)\varphi s^2/8.$$

It is straightforward to verify that  $\Delta^B$  is increasing in  $p$ , decreasing in  $s$ , and  $\Delta^B = 0$  if and only if

$$\frac{p}{s} = \sqrt{(3 - \theta - \lambda)(1 + \theta - \lambda)/\varphi} \equiv \bar{r} > 0.$$

When  $p/s > \bar{r}$ , backward integration is preferred to non-integration. When  $p/s < \bar{r}$ , it is dominated by non-integration. Differentiation establishes that  $\partial\bar{r}/\partial\varphi < 0$  and  $\partial\bar{r}/\partial\theta > 0$ .

Similarly, let

$$\Delta^F \equiv S^{VIF} - S^{NI} = -((2 - \lambda')^2 - \varphi^2)p^2/8 + \varphi(1 - \theta)^2s^2/8.$$

$\Delta^F$  is decreasing in  $p$  and increasing in  $s$ .  $\Delta^F = 0$  if and only if

$$\frac{p}{s} = \sqrt{\frac{\varphi(1 - \theta)^2}{(2 - \lambda')^2 - \varphi^2}} \equiv \underline{r} > 0.$$

When  $p/s < \underline{r}$ , forward integration is preferred to non-integration. In contrast, when  $p/s > \underline{r}$ , non-integration is preferred. Again, differentiation establishes that  $\partial\underline{r}/\partial\varphi > 0$  and  $\partial\underline{r}/\partial\theta < 0$ .

First, suppose that  $\underline{r} < \bar{r}$ . Then, the analysis so far establishes that the equilibrium organizational form is given by

$$z^* = \begin{cases} VIB & \text{if } \frac{p}{s} \geq \bar{r}, \\ NI & \text{if } \frac{p}{s} \in (\underline{r}, \bar{r}), \\ VIF & \text{if } \frac{p}{s} \leq \underline{r}. \end{cases}$$

The set of parameters such that  $\underline{r} < \bar{r}$  is non-empty. For instance, as  $\theta \rightarrow 1$  we have that  $\underline{r} \rightarrow 0$ , whereas  $\bar{r} \rightarrow (2 - \lambda)/\sqrt{\varphi} > 0$ .

Next, suppose that  $\underline{r} \geq \bar{r}$ . Then  $NI$  is always dominated by either  $VIF$  and  $VIB$ . Let

$$\Delta^{BF} \equiv S^{VIB} - S^{VIF} = (2 - \lambda')^2 p^2/8 - \varphi(2 - \lambda)^2 s^2/8.$$

$\Delta^{BF}$  is increasing in  $p$  and decreasing in  $s$ , and also  $\Delta^{BF} = 0$  if and only if

$$\frac{p}{s} > \frac{2 - \lambda}{2 - \lambda'} \sqrt{\varphi} \equiv \hat{r}.$$

When  $p/s > \hat{r}$ , backward integration is preferred to forward integration, and when  $p/s < \hat{r}$ , forward integration is preferred. Differentiation establishes that  $\partial \hat{r} / \partial \varphi > 0$  and  $\partial \hat{r} / \partial \theta = 0$ . This completes the proof of the proposition.

## Appendix B: Data Sources and Construction

Our main source of data is the plant level production data underlying the UK Census of Production (ARD). This is collected by the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) and firms have a legal obligation to reply. We use the data on all manufacturing plants from 1996–2001, along with information from the Input–Output Domestic Use Table for 1995, to measure vertical integration and other firm characteristics. We use data from the ARD from 1992–1995 to measure a number of other industry characteristics and data from the annual Business Enterprise Researcher and Development (BERD) survey from 1994–1995 to measure R&D expenditure at the industry level. U.S. variables are measured using the U.S. Census data at the four-digit level (available on the NBER Web site). The UK and U.S. data are matched based on a mapping of UK SIC92 to US SIC87 and then aggregated up to input–output industry level. See Acemoglu et al. (2004) for further discussion of the data.

### *B.1. The Plant-Level Production Data*

The ARD contains information on all production activity located in the UK. The basic unit for which information on inputs and output is reported is a reporting unit. A reporting unit can be a single plant or a group of plants owned by the same firm operating in the same four-digit industry. Information on the location and number of employees is available on all plants (called local units) within each reporting unit. There are over 150,000 reporting units in manufacturing industries with non-zero employment in the ARD each year, 1996–2000. Detailed data are collected from a random stratified sample.<sup>31</sup> Data on value added and costs for non-sampled reporting units are imputed.

Single plant firms are identified as those reporting units which represent only one plant and which have no sibling, parent, or child plants. Single plants with

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31. The sampling probabilities vary over time, with industry and with reporting unit size. Reporting units with 100 or more employees are always sampled. Below that, the sampling probabilities range from 1 in 5 to 1 in 2.

fewer than 20 employees are dropped from the analysis, resulting in between 100,000 and 130,000 reporting units being dropped per year. In addition 1,000–2,000 reporting units per year that are owned by foreign firms, are dropped, as we do not observe their foreign activities.

Plants in the ARD in these years are classified by their major product according to the 1992 revision of the four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC code). Input–Output (IO) tables are reported at the two-/three-digit level. Where more than one reporting unit exists within an IO industry these are aggregated so that there is only one observation per firm in each IO industry. The total number of firms used (after dropping the small and single and foreign owned firms and averaging over years) is 46,392. We measure firm age in each producing industry as the number of years since the first plant in that industry was established. We measure firm size in each industry by the number of employees it has in that industry. The average number of firms in an industry is measured from the ARD. Table 1 (in the main text) shows means for these variables.

### ***B.2. The Input–Output Table***

We use the Input–Output Table for 1995.<sup>32</sup> The Input–Output Table contains information on 77 manufacturing industries (supplying and producing). There are 5,929 pairs of producing–supplying industries, for which 3,840 the Input–Output Table indicates positive trade flows. For each industry pair we calculate the proportion of total costs (including intermediate, labor, and capital) of producing  $j$  that are made up of input  $k$ , denoted  $w_{jk}$ . In 2,766, or just under half of industry pairs, at least one firm is vertically integrated to some extent. Table B.1 contains descriptive statistics on the share of output from each supplying industry that is sold for intermediate consumption, to all industries and to manufacturing industries, and shows the largest purchasing industry along with the share of sales this purchaser represents (which ranges from 0.5% to over 50% and averages 3.7%) and the share of the purchaser’s total costs this input represents (which ranges from zero to 37% and averages 2.7%).

### ***B.3. Technology Indicators***

Our measures of technology intensity are all at the industry level. R&D intensity is measured using the micro data underlying the annual BERD matched to the ARD. The micro data is aggregated to the industry level using the product code for which the R&D was targeted. This is scaled by total value-added in firms producing in the industry (including both R&D and non-R&D firms).

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32. This is available at [www.statistics.gov.uk](http://www.statistics.gov.uk).

TABLE B.1. Summary of Input-Output Table statistics.

Supplying industry	all industries	% sales for intermediate consumption	Largest purchasing industry	% of total supplying industry sales going to this purchaser	% of total purchasing industry purchases coming from this supplier
8 Meat processing	0.441	0.250	29 Leather goods	0.019	0.502
9 Fish and fruit processing	0.461	0.195	9 Fish and fruit processing	0.085	0.141
10 Oils and fats	0.694	0.534	10 Oils and fats processing	0.161	0.208
11 Dairy products	0.403	0.183	11 Dairy products	0.109	0.143
12 Grain milling and starch	0.666	0.580	14 Bread, biscuits, etc.	0.192	0.191
13 Animal feed	0.751	0.020	8 Meat processing	0.017	0.009
14 Bread, biscuits, etc.	0.433	0.009	14 Bread, biscuits, etc.	0.001	0.002
15 Sugar	0.817	0.639	16 Confectionery	0.217	0.153
16 Confectionery	0.380	0.160	16 Confectionery	0.097	0.176
17 Other food products	0.332	0.137	17 Other food products	0.043	0.075
18 Alcoholic beverages	0.100	0.070	18 Alcoholic beverages	0.065	0.127
19 Soft drinks and mineral waters	0.192	0.003	19 Soft drinks & mineral waters	0.003	0.005
20 Tobacco products	0.001	0.001	20 Tobacco products	0.001	0.001
21 Textile fibres	0.681	0.646	27 Knitted goods	0.189	0.269
22 Textile weaving	0.274	0.261	28 Wearing apparel & fur products	0.158	0.092
23 Textile finishing	0.976	0.415	23 Textile finishing	0.053	0.129
24 Made-up textiles	0.193	0.052	24 Made-up textiles	0.010	0.026
25 Carpets and rugs	0.356	0.115	25 Carpets and rugs	0.004	0.009
26 Other textiles	0.513	0.427	28 Wearing apparel & fur products	0.203	0.109
27 Knitted goods	0.030	0.019	28 Wearing apparel & fur products	0.013	0.013
28 Wearing apparel and fur products	0.099	0.018	28 Wearing apparel & fur products	0.017	0.048
29 Leather goods	0.312	0.078	30 Footwear	0.042	0.076
30 Footwear	0.219	0.065	30 Footwear	0.064	0.177
31 Wood and wood products	0.894	0.519	31 Wood and wood products	0.203	0.395
32 Pulp paper and paperboard	0.672	0.559	33 Paper and paperboard products	0.243	0.285
33 Paper and paperboard products	0.885	0.520	33 Paper and paperboard products	0.055	0.133
34 Printing and publishing	0.613	0.211	34 Printing and publishing	0.132	0.334

(continued)

TABLE B.1. (CONTINUED).

Supplying industry	% sales for intermediate consumption	Largest purchasing industry	% of total industry sales going to this purchaser	% of total purchasing industry purchases coming from this supplier
35 Coke ovens, refined petroleum, & nuclear	0.450	0.108	0.013	0.093
36 Industrial gases and dyes	0.535	0.459	0.089	0.120
37 Inorganic chemicals	0.676	0.603	0.043	0.111
38 Organic chemicals	0.056	0.052	0.005	0.051
39 Fertilisers	0.839	0.154	0.146	0.273
40 Plastics & synthetic resins, etc.	0.599	0.557	0.249	0.209
41 Pesticides	0.508	0.006	0.001	0.005
42 Paints, varnishes, printing, ink, etc.	0.692	0.477	0.054	0.107
43 Pharmaceuticals	0.380	0.125	0.094	0.206
44 Soap and toilet preparations	0.229	0.105	0.085	0.146
45 Other chemical products	0.185	0.116	0.033	0.085
46 Man-made fibres	0.273	0.259	0.058	0.100
47 Rubber products	0.552	0.243	0.041	0.102
48 Plastic products	0.759	0.405	0.081	0.179
49 Glass and glass products	0.775	0.549	0.133	0.276
50 Ceramic goods	0.402	0.125	0.046	0.113
51 Structural clay products	0.723	0.003	0.001	0.004
52 Cement lime and plaster	0.882	0.336	0.286	0.136
53 Articles of concrete stone, etc.	0.851	0.024	0.022	0.044
54 Iron and steel	0.596	0.561	0.138	0.253
55 Non-ferrous metals	0.658	0.611	0.218	0.450
56 Metal castings	0.973	0.790	0.175	0.107
57 Structural metal products	0.472	0.115	0.025	0.050
58 Metal boilers and radiators	0.348	0.158	0.084	0.174
59 Metal, forging, pressing, etc.	0.964	0.864	0.077	0.212

(continued)

TABLE B.1. (CONTINUED).

Supplying industry	% sales for intermediate consumption all industries manufacturing	Largest purchasing industry	% of total supplying industry sales going to this purchaser	% of total purchasing industry purchases coming from this supplier
60 Cutlery, tools, etc.	0.545	60 Cutlery, tools, etc.	0.024	0.063
61 Other metal products	0.690	71 Insulated wire and cable	0.014	0.114
62 Mechanical power equipment	0.285	62 Mechanical power equipment	0.055	0.125
63 General purpose machinery	0.202	63 General purpose machinery	0.020	0.042
64 Agricultural machinery	0.132	64 Agricultural machinery	0.006	0.015
65 Machine tools	0.181	65 Machine tools	0.011	0.023
66 Special purpose machinery	0.293	66 Special purpose machinery	0.046	0.102
67 Weapons and ammunition	0.554	67 Weapons and ammunition	0.154	0.336
68 Domestic appliances nec	0.187	68 Domestic appliances nec	0.007	0.014
69 Office machinery & computers	0.060	69 Office machinery & computers	0.035	0.094
70 Electric motors and generators, etc.	0.390	70 Electric motors and generators, etc.	0.072	0.165
71 Insulated wire and cable	0.550	71 Insulated wire and cable	0.031	0.073
72 Electrical equipment nec	0.491	74 Transmitters for TV, radio, and phone	0.112	0.274
73 Electronic components	0.126	69 Office machinery & computers	0.048	0.052
74 Transmitters for TV, radio, and phone	0.204	74 Transmitters for TV, radio, and phone	0.014	0.032
75 Receivers for TV and radio	0.134	75 Receivers for TV and radio	0.055	0.126
76 Medical and precision instruments	0.360	76 Medical and precision instruments	0.036	0.090
77 Motor vehicles	0.200	64 Agricultural machinery	0.005	0.200
78 Shipbuilding and repair	0.536	78 Shipbuilding and repair	0.061	0.142
79 Other transport equipment	0.275	79 Other transport equipment	0.152	0.305
80 Aircraft and spacecraft	0.107	80 Aircraft and spacecraft	0.011	0.029
81 Furniture	0.233	81 Furniture	0.053	0.114
82 Jewelry and related products	0.020	82 Jewelry & related products	0.016	0.044
83 Sports goods and toys	0.014	12 Grain milling and starch	0.001	0.001
84 Miscellaneous manufacturing nec & recycl	0.543	56 Metal castings	0.034	0.117

Source: UK ONS, 1995 Input-Output Tables.

TABLE B.2. Robustness checks.

Dependent variable: $vi_{ijk}$	(1) exclude bottom quartiles of firms by size	(2) exclude top quartiles of firms by size	(3) dependent variable: $\bar{v}l_{ijk}$
Share of costs ( $jk$ )	0.201 (0.030)	0.103 (0.021)	0.114 (0.016)
R&D intensity, producing ( $j$ )	0.030 (0.006)	0.014 (0.003)	0.022 (0.004)
× Share of costs	1.146 (0.389)	0.477 (0.254)	0.554 (0.224)
R&D intensity, supplying ( $k$ )	-0.0074 (0.0038)	-0.005 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)
× Share of costs	-0.953 (0.352)	-0.474 (0.211)	-0.413 (0.199)
Observations	2,249,095	2,234,459	2,973,008
Covariates	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' calculations using the UK ONS data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry pair level. R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. In regression with interactions, all main effects evaluated at sample means. Covariates in all specifications include: firm size and age, producing and supplying industry, average size, and average age.

TABLE B.3. Nonlinearities.

Dependent variable: $vi_{ijk}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of cost:				
2nd quartile			0.0027 (0.0004)	0.0024 (0.0004)
3rd quartile			0.0092 (0.0007)	0.0081 (0.0006)
4th quartile			0.0186 (0.0011)	0.0176 (0.0011)
<b>Producing industry R&amp;D intensity:</b>				
2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile	0.0036 (0.0010)		0.0034 (0.0009)	0.0015 (0.0008)
3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile	0.0050 (0.0010)		0.0040 (0.0009)	0.0028 (0.0008)
4 <sup>th</sup> quartile	0.0057 (0.0010)		0.0049 (0.0008)	0.0029 (0.0009)
<b>Supplying industry R&amp;D intensity:</b>				
2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile		-0.0080 (0.0014)	-0.0062 (0.0011)	-0.0049 (0.0010)
3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile		-0.0039 (0.0014)	-0.0019 (0.0012)	0.0002 (0.0011)
4 <sup>th</sup> quartile		-0.0043 (0.0014)	-0.0040 (0.0012)	-0.0008 (0.0012)
Covariates	no	no	no	yes

Source: Authors' calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996–2001. There are 2,973,008 observations at the firm–industry pair level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level indicated. R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the two-/three-digit industry level and average over the years 1994–1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 Input–Output Table and is at the industry pair level. Covariates included where indicated are: producing firm size, age, mean firm size, and mean firm age in producing and supplying industries. The reference group is zero share of costs and bottom quartiles of R&D intensity in producing and supplying industries.

The ratio of physical investment (capital expenditure on machinery, buildings, land and vehicles) to value added is constructed in a similar manner from the ARD data at the industry level and averaged over the years 1992–1995.

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